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DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL § 211:

Cooling-off period does not apply to counterclaim for
separation in an annulment action.

Under the new Section 211 of the DRL,'5 3 a complaint in any
action for a divorce or separation cannot be served until the
expiration of a 120 day "cooling-off" period or, in the case of a
divorce action, at the expiration of conciliation proceedings, which-

ever period is less. 54 In Botti v. Botti, 5 5 the husband brought an
action for an annulment and the wife counterclaimed for a separation. The court rejected the husband's contention that the counterclaim was a violation of section 211 and allowed the wife's counterclaim without requiring the statutory cooling-off period. The court
reasoned that section 211, by its language, applied only to divorce
and separation actions and had no application in a suit for annulment. It was concluded that since the new section contained no
prohibition against entering a counterclaim, it should be allowed
under CPLR 3011 and 3019(a) and under "the liberal and expanding practice in claims between litigants to avoid multiplicity
and circuity of actions." 156 The court directed that the husband's
action for annulment be tried first and upon an unfavorable determination of that action, that the wife's claim be adjudicated.
It may be argued that the court's decision is inconsistent with
the intent of the legislature in providing for the cooling-off period.
However, it can be fairly said that in a situation such as this,
there is little hope of saving the marriage and a cooling-off period
or conciliation proceedings would be futile. In any event, the language of the statute appears to justify the conclusion of the court,
and if the legislature did not intend such a result, an amendment
would seem to be in order.
DRL § 211:

Amendment of complaint for separation to include
action for divorce allowed.

In another case involving an interpretation of Section
the DRL 5 7 the husband moved to amend his complaint in
ration action so as to demand a divorce upon the same
allegations.'
The question arose as to whether such an

211 of
a sepafactual
amend-

N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 7.
For the law on conciliation proceedings see N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966,
ch. 254, §8.
155 55 Misc. 2d 269, 284 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).
56 Id. at 271, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
7
15 Taplinger v. Taplinger, 55 Misc. 2d 103, 284 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1967).
158 The plaintiff was motivated by the recently amended DRL § 170.
See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 2.
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